What Is Securitisation, Really?

05 Jan 2026

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5 minute read

Every business that lends money, leases assets, or issues invoices is sitting on future cash.

The problem is timing.

That cash doesn’t arrive in a satisfying lump. It trickles in. Month by month. Invoice by invoice. Payment by payment. Meanwhile, the business still has wages to pay, suppliers to placate, and growth plans that refuse to wait politely.

Those future payments have value.
They’re just inconveniently slow about revealing it.

Securitisation exists to solve that problem.

Instead of waiting years for money to arrive, a business can reorganise those future payments so that investors provide funding upfront and are repaid as the cashflows come in. Everything else in a securitisation structure exists to make that simple trade acceptable to everyone involved.

Despite its reputation, securitisation isn’t complicated.

It’s a timing solution – with very good lawyers.

Mortgages generate monthly repayments.
Car loans pay down over time.
Trade receivables turn into cash when customers eventually decide that today feels like a paying day.

All of those future payments are valuable. The difficulty is that they arrive gradually, unevenly, and usually at exactly the wrong moment if you’re trying to run or grow a business.

Securitisation takes those future payments and uses them to raise money today.

Instead of waiting five years to be paid in full, a company can:

  • pool those future cashflows together,
  • move them into a separate vehicle, and
  • raise funding from investors who are perfectly happy to be repaid over time.

The company gets cash upfront.
Investors get exposure to defined cashflows.
Risk is shifted, reshaped and priced along the way.

That’s securitisation.

No mystery.
No alchemy.

It’s tempting to think of securitisation as just another form of borrowing. Money comes in at the start. MoneIt’s tempting to think of securitisation as just another form of borrowing. Money comes in at the start. Money goes out later. Tick the box and job done.

That temptation should be resisted.

In a traditional loan:

  • the company borrows money directly,
  • the assets stay on the company’s balance sheet, and
  • the company carries the risk if things go wrong.

In securitisation:

  • the cashflow-generating assets are transferred out of the business,
  • the funding is tied to those assets rather than the company as a whole, and
  • investors care far more about how the pool performs than whether the originator has an exciting strategic future.

That’s why securitisation is described as off-balance-sheet funding – not because anything’s being hidden, but because the risk has genuinely moved.

The investors aren’t lending to the company.
They’re buying exposure to the cashflows.

That difference isn’t technical nit-picking. It’s the whole point.

If securitisation were about financing a single loan or a single invoice, nobody would bother.

One borrower defaults and the entire structure collapses. End of story.

Pooling changes everything.

By combining hundreds or thousands of similar assets:

  • individual borrower risk fades into the background,
  • performance becomes statistically predictable, and
  • cashflows smooth out into something investors can live with.

That’s why securitisations gravitate towards:

  • granular pools,
  • consistent asset types, and
  • long performance histories.

One unpaid invoice is risky.
Ten thousand invoices behaving roughly as expected are boring.

And boring, in structured finance, is a feature.

Pooling isn’t about making things complicated.
It’s about making risk measurable – which is the only kind of risk markets will reliably finance.

Rather than holding these pooled assets directly, securitisations almost always use a Special Purpose Vehicle – an SPV.

The SPV exists for one reason only: to sit between the originator and the investors.

  • It owns the assets.
  • It issues the securities.
  • It receives the cashflows.
  • It pays investors according to pre-agreed rules.

And crucially, it’s designed to be boring.

No side projects. No ambition. No entrepreneurial flair. The SPV exists to do exactly what it says on the tin and nothing else. If the originator fails, the assets should keep performing inside the SPV without anyone panicking.

Securitisation works because the cashflows are separated from the company that created them. Everything else is decoration.

At a high level, every securitisation has the same three essential characters.

The originator
The business that created the assets – the lender, lessor, or supplier issuing invoices.

The SPV (issuer)
The entity that buys the assets and issues the securities.

The investors
Institutions looking for predictable returns backed by defined cashflows – not a front-row seat to corporate drama.

Around them orbit servicers, trustees, banks, lawyers, accountants, and rating agencies. All important. All busy. But structurally, those three roles are the foundation. Everything else exists to keep the machine running smoothly.

Trade receivables securitisation is one of the clearest ways to see how this works in practice.

A company issues invoices to customers. Payment’s due in 30, 60, or 90 days. Cashflow is lumpy. Growth stalls. Anyone who’s waited for a large customer to pay will recognise the feeling immediately.

Instead of waiting, the company can:

  • sell a pool of receivables to an SPV,
  • receive cash upfront, often funded by investors or banks,
  • continue servicing the receivables operationally, and
  • pass collections through to the SPV.

The SPV uses those collections to repay its funders.

If structured properly, this isn’t a loan secured on receivables. It’s a genuine sale of future cashflows.

The company gets working capital.
Investors get diversified exposure.
Risk attaches to customer payment behaviour, not management optimism.

Scale the same logic up and you arrive at mortgages, car loans, consumer credit, and beyond.

Before going any further, a few myths need clearing up.

Securitisation isn’t:

  • about hiding risk,
  • about endlessly multiplying leverage, or
  • about turning bad assets into good ones through documentation alone.

What it actually does is:

  • isolate risk,
  • make it visible, and
  • allocate it deliberately.

When securitisations fail, they fail for reasons that are rarely mysterious:

  • bad assets,
  • weak underwriting,
  • too much leverage, or
  • incentives pointing in the wrong direction.

The structure itself is neutral. It reflects the quality of what goes into it – not the quality of the sales pitch.

If banks could lend infinitely, cheaply, and without constraint, securitisation wouldn’t exist.

They can’t.

Capital rules, funding costs, and regulatory limits mean balance sheets fill up. Securitisation allows lenders to:

  • recycle capital,
  • diversify funding sources, and
  • keep lending without carrying ever-growing risk.

At the same time, investors – pension funds, insurers, asset managers – want exposure to predictable cashflows without full corporate exposure.

Securitisation sits between those needs.

It isn’t unusual.
It’s plumbing.

If you remember one thing, remember this:

Securitisation is the sale of cashflows, not a loan to a company.

Everything else – SPVs, tranches, credit enhancement, ratings, documentation – exists to support that single idea.

And once that foundation is clear, the next question becomes unavoidable:

what gets securitised – and why do some assets behave far better than others?

That’s where things get interesting.

This article is part of a series examining how securitisation works in practice – from the assets involved, to the structures used, and how risk is allocated. Each article is written to stand on its own, while contributing to a broader explanation of securitisation and its role in modern finance.

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